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Dasein as Attunement, and Social Inquiry
Talk presented to the Alpis Information Systems 2009 Annual Conference
Carisolo, Italy
by
Kenneth Liberman
University of Oregon
Introduction
1. From Claudio Ciborra, “Getting to the Heart of the Situation,” pp. 5-6.
[It could also be titled, “The Transition from Befindlichkeit to ‘Situated.’”]:
“References to phenomenology are often made, but never quite fully explored
and exploited. Collateral aspects are mentioned, such transparency, ready-tohandedness and so on. Yet nobody quotes Section 29 of Being and Time, where
Heidegger (1962, pp. 172 – 182) introduces the notion of situatedness
(Befinlichkeit), contrasting it with the privileged role attributed then (and now)
to understanding, cognition and the purely mental. … Lack of proper references
to phenomenology while using its ascendance may also induce the reader not
versed in philosophy to believe that what these authors say about situatedness is
indeed all that phenomenology has had to say on the subject.”
As a social phenomenologist I can say that I have spent much the past four
decades wincing whenever I heard or read sociologists, anthropologists,
linguists, etc. use the term “phenomenological.” The thin, shallow use of the
term “phenomenology” is probably the principal reason I have rejected
manuscripts I review for publication.
So when I was asked to speak to you about phenomenology, I thought than
instead of offering more talk about phenomenology, our meeting could be an
occasion for reading some phenomenology, and I could think of no better
selection from Heidegger than the Section 29 cited by Ciborra.
2. I wish I could have known Ciborra. In reading him, I understand that I missed
meeting a good friend. He has that balance of science and humanity that is what
is most rewarding about my professional life.
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I. What is the big deal about “in situ”?
A. How can something so subjective have had so much influence?
For the significant reason that the way that most of our models represent the
world is deeply flawed.
And this is because a good deal of our lives are subjective.
There is no “objective” that is not accompanied by an interpretation;
therefore, there exists only a subjective objective and never an objective
objective.
B. More importantly, our lives are much more complicated than the purveyors of
planful thought and rational choice would have it.
Let me mention just one phenomenon of ordinary life in situ renders most
modeling of cognitive activity foolish, and that is reflexivity of
understanding:
Reflexivity refers to practices that at the same time describe and constitute
a social framework – or rather, the practices constitute the framework as
they describe it (i.e., the describing is the constituting). Reflexivity is that
feature of comprehending some structure of social action that
presupposes, while it provides, the conditions that make its own
intelligibility reasonable and sensible.
Planful accounts miss the reflexivity, which is the moment-by-moment
adjustment and feedback between reflection and situation and is so
spontaneous that it cannot be predicted in advance; accordingly,
oftentimes planful accounts cannot locate the real problems that people
have.
All this was something of an embarrassment to the organization theory of
information systems researchers, and so talk of “situated” studies began,
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largely led by ethnomethodological research projects that located the
“troubles” that were to be found on local occasions, projects that exposed
the work of the reflexivity of understanding.
C. Because of reflexivity and other phenomena like it, such as the indexicality of
meanings, textbook versions rarely reflect reality.
> Take the Oregon state highway policy, which puts all good ideas on the
back-burner, no matter how brilliant they sound in theory:
they have learned, as part of their practical work, never to administer a new
policy of lane-painting, sign-posting, signal systems, traffic-routing, etc.
without first implementing it on a trial-only basis.
This is for the very good reason that they have had a long experience with
unanticipated consequences. There are so many of these unanticipated
consequences that they have concluded they are unanticipatable.
> Take the people who write computer programs, who have similarly learned
not only that they cannot predict which bugs will occur, they also cannot
predict what clever things they have devised, until the people who use the
beta versions report back to them. These reports on beta versions even teach
them how they should market the programs.
> Take the man who worked for the 3-M company who invented post-its. He
was reading a technical book on an airplane and kept losing the place in the
book where the footnotes were. So when he got back to the lab he invented
post-its. He didn’t have the slightest idea he would change how every office
in the world worked; but he is happy to accept the credit for his wonder just
the same.
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II.The Problem of Over-conceptualizing, and the Limits of Conoscenza Teoretica
A. What Heidegger calls “Attunement” (Il Trovarsi) is one of the fundamental
three existential facts of life – the other two are “Understanding” and
“Discourse.”
Attunement is the name for a being more than a knowing: attunement does
not know why (127a) it is … “Non si sa. Sono cose che l’esserci non può
sapere” (It 389b/ G 134b)
Derrida is following Heidegger’s lead when he keeps seeking ways to infect
his inquiries with non-knowledge.
According to Heidegger, “Discourse does not, as such, mean to be known.”
(127b/ G 134c)
And, “The possibilities of disclosure to cognition fall far short …”
(1217a)
B. But at the same time Heidegger sternly warns us against becoming
‘touchy-feely.’ Having taken a stand against common sense as well as
against formal theoretical cognition, Heidegger still insists on a rigorous
attention to the just-what of the actual experience in situ. This is what is
meant by phenomenology. Heidegger writes (130b),
“We must not confuse demonstrating the existential-ontological
constitution of cognitive determination in the attunement of beingin-the-world with the attempt to surrender science to feeling.”
This rigor, our rigor, must pay attention only to “evidence” (German:
Evidenz, Italian Evidenza), which is one of the basic notions of Husserl’s
program of rigorous inquiry. Formal analytic accounts miss this Evidenz
due to the myopia created by their continuous preoccupation with their
theorizing.
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C. “Disclosedness does not mean ‘to be known’.”
One must already have found itself in a situation when one commences to
know.
And we are not to minimize the Evidenz of attunement “by measuring it
against the apodictic certainty of the theoretical cognition.” (128b)
Merleau-Ponty expanded these inquiries in his project of nondualistic
reflection, what he called sur-reflection.
We are catching sight of the necessity of another operation besides
conversion to reflection, more fundamental than it, of a sort of surréflection [that] would not lose sight of the brute thing and the brute
perception and would not finally efface them, would not cut the
organic bonds … [of] our mute contact with the world when they are
not yet things said.… It must plunge into the world instead of
surveying it. (Visible and the Invisible, 38-9)
Heid p. 138: “Theoretical looking at the world has always flattened it
down to the uniformity of what is purely objectively present.”
Let’s read the Italian (401): “Lo sguardo teoretico ha gìa sempre
schermato il mondo sull’uniformità del mero sottomano,”
D. But Heidegger is sophisticated enough to recognize that theoretical
cognition brings benefits as well as limits:
Continuing the Italian: “…un’uniformità dentro quale, certo, è contenuta
la nuova richheza di tutto quanto può essere svelato da un puro
determinare.”
Or, in English, “… although, of course, a new abundance of what can be
discovered in pure determination lies within that uniformity.”
What is this abundance? And way is it that formal reason brings such
abundance along with closing us off to the complexity of real events?
Prof. Fele and I are undertaking a study of coffee tasting; that is, how
assaggiatore di caffè organize the intelligibility of the coffee descriptors
they use. The formal terms they have, like “rich”, “medium bodied,”
“acidic,” “rotondo,” fiorito,” “vellutato,” etc. all permit them to locate
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tastes and stabilize the intelligibility of their sensory experience. We are
doing a real phenomenology of coffee tasting. But we have discovered
that alongside making it possible for them to find, purchase and verify
shipments of first-rate coffee, these terms close off some tastes, tastes
that have a difficult time being noticed.
Italy’s principal assaggiatore di caffè writes of the tasting card in both
positive and pejorative terms:
The card certainly plays an important role in guiding the judging
procedures that apply. However, we must remember that it is only a
tool, and the taster is responsible for recognizing and evaluating
organoleptic characteristics … the second [card] is based on thorough
research aimed at modernizing the card by insisting that sensorial
analysis is conducted with strict rules.” (Giudo odello, Espresso
Italiano Tasting, Brescia (It.): Centro Studi Assaggiatori, 2007, p. 46.
Or, In Italian (p. 47): “Non disigna mai dimenticare che essa è solo
uno strumento da capire e da utilizzare, la rilevazione delle
caratteristiche organolettiche, la loro elaborazione in giudizi e la
successiva espressione è di pertinenza del degustatore che mai potrà
scaricarsi di questa responsibilità … la seconda [scheda], realizzata
sulla scorta di una forte ricerca volta all’innovazione e in
considerazione delle severe regole dell’anilisi sensoriale.”
The seeming contradiction here is not a flaw in the procedure – formal
analyses always and necessarily provide “elaborazione in giudizi”
while at the same time cannot be made to substitute for the
“responsabilità” to actually taste. And yet as professional thinkers,
we are continually trying to accomplish this very thing.
III. Befindlichkeit
Evidenz demands that we first taste, and Attunement pays respect to an
unerstanding that is more doing than knowing.
Befindlichkeit or Attunement is rendered in Italian as Trovarsi, which is a
reflexive verb. reflexive verbs are really splendid things, because they
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already undermine the human conceit that we are always in control of
affairs.
Take a verb like annoiarsi, “to become bored.” The logic of reflexive verbs
better represents the actual situation than the non-reflective English.
In the case of Befindlichkeit, it is a state one finds oneself in without any
deliberate doing. As Heidegger (129) tells us, “[Mood] never comes from
‘without’ nor from ‘within,’ but rises from being-in-the-world itself.”
Here Heidegger is referring to things like when we grow tired of ourselves,
when our being has become manifest to us as a burden, such as when we
are bored.
A closely related term that Heidegger uses is Umsicht, or “circumspective
attention,” “la circumspectio” which is not quite “sapere,” “conoscenza,” or
“conosciuto.” This is the preliminary taking of bearing that people do to
find a context before they settle into a it. It implies a broad sweep, and
Heidegger contrast it with the more invasive, paternalist strategies of
technological manipulation.
IV. The Limits of Formal Analysis
A. Much of the foundational experience that Heidegger is describing is not
subject to formal investigation, at least not without distorting its basic
character beyond recognition.
Ciborra (p. 12) writes of Lucy Suchman’s findings:
“Her empirical study confirms that the organization of situated action is an
emergent property of the moment-by-moment interactions between actors
and their relevant environments. Expert systems are built on a planning
model of human action. ‘The model treats a plan as something located in
the actor’s head.’”
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The proponents of “planning models,” which includes artificial intelligence
designers and rational choice theorists but excludes the Oregon state
highway planners, try to resolve difficulties by attempting to “embed into
expert systems more and more sophisticated plans.” (my italics, Ciborra 12)
But this loses sight of Heidegger’s discovery that Dasein finds him/herself in a
situation before beginning to reflect analytically, that a world already
“matters to it” (129b) (“potere-essere-toccato”, It. 399b) before knowing.
And this is where occurs most of the confusions of the users of Xerox
machines that are documented by Suchman.
Dasein has always found itself “always already” (128a/ già sempre trovato
It. 391c) in a finding which does not come from a direct seeking
(trovato in un trovare che non scaturisce tanto da un diretto cercare).
B. The more that formal analytic investigators inspect a situation the less they
will see. Heidegger (127c) observes, “The that of facticity is never to be
found by looking.”
“Il fatto-che della fatticità non è mai reperibile in un vedere intuitivo.”
(It. 391b)
That is because looking - un diretto cercare - is already looking for
something; that is, one already has the frame of experience built – one’s
mind is so full of what one already knows that one cannot see anything
except what one has put into the world oneself. it may be called positive
science, but it is deluded, and the Tibetans I lived with have a great name
for such delusion: they call it “ignorance” (ma rig ma).
For Tibetans it is not what you don’t know that makes you ignorant, it is
what you do know. One’s mind is so filled with the certainty of what one
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does know that there is no room to learn anything new. Especially, there
is no room to learn what one does not already know.
C. There is no better model to be found for the imperialism of planful
theorizing than the social theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John
Stuart Mill. They offer an extreme rationalism whereby humans are born as
separate individuals, come together out of their own free will, and then
commence to abstractly negotiate their rights in a social contract. This is
nothing more than a “just-so” of the origin of society. People know nothing
more than what these rationalist theorists put into their heads. It may be that
people do not know more, but they do more than Hobbes, et. al. are able to
account for. And this “more” is fairly well addressed by Heidegger in
Section 29.
There is planful action as pre-determined rationalities, and then there is
planful action as the actual course of the situated action, as bricolage, as
difference, as reflexivity, and all the other ways we are learning to think –
or not to think – about these quotidian activities that are the preoccupation
of information system researchers. Theodor Adorno speaks of mimesis, a
mode of social being that precedes formal reflection as being more critical
to understanding than conceptual knowing, and we should note here that
Adorno was a sworn opponent of Heidegger for all of his professional life.
D. Heidegger’s recommendation is instead of commandeering events,instead
of “staring out at something” (129b)
“un guardar fisso”/”Empfinded oder Anstarren” (It 399a /G137a),
we should regard things in “a circumspectfully heedful way” (Il pro-curante
… circumspettivo). In this way we can listen to the phenomena we are
studying and not exclusively organize the intelligibility of it.
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Conclusion
This does not mean we have to leave off of formal analysis, but it does mean
that we must first attune ourselves to what is there, and to the horizons of
experience and understanding that are at work there whether our theories
are present or not.
A very important question for who wish to work in a phenomenological way
is how do we get access to the non-rational? What we have mostly are
rational tools, so how can we make them sensitive to the actual “work”
that people are doing in their everyday, practical lives?
Conclusion to § 29:
“The phenomenological interpretation must give to Dasein itself the
possibility of primordial disclosure and let it, so to speak, interpret itself.”
(131b)
This is another way of reciting the principal phenomenological slogan, “To
the things themselves!”
And our work of making social inquiry is not absent, because we have the
descriptive task of raising “the phenomenal content of disclosure
existentially to a conceptual level.”
“elevare al concetto l’importo fenomenale cosí dischiuso” (It. 403)
That is, our thinking must be kept appropriate to the events we are
describing, and we must avoid submerging those events beneath our
brilliant plans and theories.
So now have a serious task – how do we teach each other speak objectively
about these things?
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